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Background
In 2012, Singapore’s venerable Evidence Act (EA),1 which is based on Stephen’s Indian Evidence Act of
1872, underwent major amendments for only the third time in 120 years.2 Previously, conflicting case
law had created long-standing confusion as to whether the Singapore courts possessed any discretion to
exclude evidence even when was found relevant under the EA.3 The main reason driving this jurispru-
dential inconsistency was that while the relevancy provisions in the EA were meant to provide exhaus-
tive definitions of admissibility, Stephen’s then-revolutionary ‘inclusionary’ approach to relevance was
simply at odds with modern conceptions of relevance and modern litigation practice.4 Thus, more often
than not, the Singapore courts would refer to the common law rules of evidence rather than the EA.5
The dust began to settle in 2008, when the Court of Appeal (the apex court in Singapore) affirmed in
Lee Chez Kee v Public Prosecutor that ‘apart from the confines of the EA, there is no residual discretion
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to exclude evidence which is otherwise rendered legally relevant by the EA’.6 Subsequently, the Law
Reform Committee confirmed the validity of this position by stating that the EA drew ‘no distinction
between the concepts of relevance and admissibility’ and that under the EA ‘relevance means admissi-
bility’.7 This essentially reiterated its position taken in an earlier report, where it had stated that the EA is
meant to be the only point of reference when determining matters of relevance and admissibility.8 Nota-
bly, all of these conclusions comported with Stephen’s belief that the only ground on which relevant
evidence should be denied admissibility is if the relevance of the evidence is not sufficiently material.9
However, the 2012 amendments to the EA brought about a new wave of confusion.10 In response to
petitions by commercial litigation lawyers,11 Parliament broadened the number of exceptions to the
hearsay and expert opinion rule by expanding ss. 32 and 47 of the EA. But ss. 32(3) and 47(4) were also
created, which expressly confer on the courts the discretion to exclude evidence found relevant under the
EA ‘if the court is of the view that it would not be in the interests of justice to treat it as relevant’. The
precise meaning of the phrase ‘in the interests of justice’ has been shrouded in uncertainty ever since,
given that the classic formulation of the exclusionary discretion (in criminal cases at least) is to weigh
the probative value against the prejudicial effect of a piece of evidence, but it is not obvious if ‘in the
interests of justice’ refers to that.12
After more than two years, there is finally judicial clarification regarding the amendments in the form
of two contemporaneous High Court decisions. As there are still quite a number of Indian Evidence Act
jurisdictions that have kept their evidence legislation largely intact over the years, this note may be of
comparative interest.
Summary of the decisions
The first decision, ANB v ANC,13 involved matrimonial proceedings. The husband alleged that his com-
puter had been hacked into. The wife said that she had indeed accessed his computer (which she claimed
was not password-protected) as she wanted to prevent their children from realising that the husband had
been visiting adult websites. However, she noticed some files that revealed a detailed plot by the hus-
band to frame her during the divorce proceedings. She hired a private investigator to copy the files,
which included communications between the husband and his lawyer. As the wife’s actions made her
potentially liable under the Computer Misuse Act14 and Penal Code,15 there was an issue of whether
evidence obtained under such circumstances was admissible.
While Justice Loh ultimately declined jurisdiction on the basis that the tribunal was not properly
seised of the matter,16 he surveyed the case law and the Hansard and noted that, notwithstanding the
2012 amendments to the EA, the Singapore courts have always possessed an exclusionary discretion
to exclude relevant evidence that ‘stems from the inherent jurisdiction of the court to prevent injustice
at trial’.17 Though he did not say so explicitly, there is no doubt he equated the phrase ‘in the interests of
6. [2008] 3 SLR(R) 447 at [106]. See also Law Society of Singapore v Tan Guat Neo Phyllis [2008] 2 SLR(R) 239 at [126] and
[150]; Public Prosecutor v Mas Swan bin Adnan [2011] SGHC 107 at [105]–[107].
7. Singapore Law Reform Committee (2011: 7).
8. Singapore Law Reform Committee (2007: 8–9). See also Siyuan and Poon (2012: 547–553).
9. Stephen (1881: 3). See also Prasad and Mohan (2013: 92–93).
10. See Siyuan (2013a, 2013b).
11. See for instance Second Reading of Evidence (Amendment) Bill, Singapore Parliament Reports, 14 February 2012 (Hri
Kumar and Vikram Nair).
12. Keane and McKeown (2012: 45–49); Choo (2012: 13–15).
13. [2014] SGHC 172.
14. Chapter 50A, rev. ed., 2007.
15. Chapter 224, rev. ed., 2008.
16. ANB v ANC [2014] SGHC 172 at [52].
17. Above n. 16 at [50].
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justice’ under ss. 32(3) and 47(4) with the test of balancing probative value and prejudicial effect.18 He
also suggested that in civil proceedings, ‘the prejudicial effect assumes a far lighter weight and role’.19
Accordingly, he implied that the wife’s evidence may have been admissible.20
The second decision, Wan Lai Ting v Kea Kah Kim,21 involved a dispute over the transfer of shares.
The applicant sought to admit two affidavits of evidence-in-chief (AEICs) sworn by an elderly woman
(Lau) pursuant to s. 32(1)(j) of the EA.22 She argued that these AEICs should be admissible hearsay evi-
dence as Lau was too ill to travel from Hong Kong to testify in court, and taking her evidence by video
link would be too costly. The defendant argued that as the points made in the AEICs were disputed, it
was important that he was able to cross-examine Lau.
Judicial Commissioner (JC) Leow held that although he was prepared to accept that it was impractic-
able for Lau to travel to Singapore to testify, he was not convinced that her health was in such a dire state
that she was unfit to be cross-examined via video-link; moreover, as the applicant was seeking to rely on
Lau’s evidence, it was incumbent on her to take all reasonable steps to make Lau available as a witness.23
He further held that the applicant was probably attempting to admit the AEICs via s. 32 for ‘ulterior rea-
sons’ as ‘she was afraid that Lau’s evidence might not withstand cross-examination’.24 In light of the
great importance of Lau’s evidence in resolving the dispute, the evidence was held to be inadmissible
as ‘the prejudicial effect of Lau’s AEICs far outweighed their probative value, and it was not in the inter-
ests of justice to admit them’.25
Analysis
When ss. 32(3) and 47(4) of the EA were passed into law, academic criticism was swift. A leading com-
mentator described the new test as ‘unnecessarily vague’ and being ‘silent as to the mechanism that the
court might apply and the factors it would take into account in exercising its discretion’.26 More funda-
mentally, the new test raises ‘conceptual and practical concerns’ by introducing ‘a legal fiction to the
effect that [facts found under those provisions] were never relevant (admissible) or somehow lost their
relevancy (status of admissibility) pursuant to the court’s discretion’.27 The new test also does not ‘attach
any significance to the nature of the proceedings . . . despite the need for a more sensitive or flexible
approach in criminal cases’.28 These criticisms are unsurprising as there was no paucity of comparative
legislation that Parliament could have drawn upon for greater clarity.
For instance, in New Zealand, the judge must exclude evidence if its probative value is out-
weighed by the risk that the evidence will have an unfairly prejudicial effect on the proceeding
or needlessly prolong the proceeding; in criminal proceedings, the judge must also factor in the
18. Ibid. at [31]–[49].
19. Ibid. at [51].
20. Ibid. at [52].
21. [2014] SGHC 180.
22. The provision states: ‘statements of relevant facts made by a person (whether orally, in a document or otherwise), are
themselves relevant facts . . . when the statement is made by a person in respect of whom it is shown—(i) is dead or unfit
because of his bodily or mental condition to attend as a witness; (ii) that despite reasonable efforts to locate him, he cannot be
found whether within or outside Singapore; (iii) that he is outside Singapore and it is not practicable to secure his attendance;
or (iv) that, being competent but not compellable to give evidence on behalf of the party desiring to give the statement in
evidence, he refuses to do so’.
23. Wan Lai Ting v Kea Kah Kim [2014] SGHC 180 at [17].
24. Ibid. at [19].
25. Ibid. The court also held that the evidence would not be admissible via O. 38 r. 2(1) of the Rules of Court (ch. 322, r. 5, rev. ed.,
2014) either, for the same reason that the evidence was inherently contentious but unreliable.
26. Pinsler (2013b: 236).
27. Ibid. at 235.
28. Ibid. at 238–239.
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right of the accused to offer an effective defence.29 In Australia, the court may refuse to admit evi-
dence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger that the evidence might be
unfairly prejudicial to a party, be misleading or confusing, or cause or result in undue waste of
time; in criminal proceedings, the court must refuse to admit the evidence if the probative value
is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the accused.30 In the US, the court may exclude
relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, misleading of the jury, undue delay, wasting time or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence.31
One immediately notices significant variations (via the italicised text) in how the balancing test is
formulated in each jurisdiction—and that none of them uses the phrase ‘in the interests of justice’.32
By framing ss. 32(3) and 47(4) in such wide and vague terms, Parliament must have anticipated that the
Singapore courts would eventually refer to foreign evidence legislation to interpret the new test,33 yet
this is always going to be a challenge as s. 2(2) of the EA states: ‘All rules of evidence not contained
in any written law, so far as such rules are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Act, are
repealed’. If the record of Singapore courts faithfully applying s. 2(2) is anything to go by, the prospects
are not promising.34 Of course, by this stage, one must have already presupposed that the test of ‘in the
interests of justice’ is generally indistinguishable from the balancing test—a presupposition that both
ANB and Wan Lai Ting readily adopted, albeit with some attempts to incrementally develop the idea
of ‘in the interests of justice’.
Specifically, in ANB, Justice Loh introduced at least three new nuances: first, the balancing test
is not only triggered in cases where the evidence has very low probative value, but can apply where
the impugned evidence has a high probative value as well; secondly, any resort to the inherent jur-
isdiction of the court must be made sparingly; and thirdly, although the EA applies to both civil and
criminal proceedings, the balancing test should be applied more stringently in criminal cases as the
presumption of innocence is paramount.35 JC Leow in Wan Tai Ling, in prescribing that s. 32 can-
not be used for ‘ulterior purposes’, effectively added another factor—that of prevention of abuse of
process—to be considered when assessing the prejudicial effect of a piece of evidence.36
While it may be said that the test of ‘in the interests of justice’ is wide enough to accommodate
all of these incremental developments, the fact is that on closer inspection of the Hansard, Parlia-
ment actually came very close to abolishing the EA provisions on hearsay and expert opinion alto-
gether.37 Sections 32(3) and 47(4) were, in effect, a compromise designed to mitigate the risk of
over-admissibility of evidence under ss. 32 and 47. The resultant flexibility accorded to judges
interpreting ss. 32(3) and 47(4) is but an echo of the sort of extreme flexibility that the former
Chief Justice of Singapore once espoused, in that as Singapore has long abolished jury trials and
judges are supposed to be highly competent fact-finders who do not need the protection of
29. Evidence Act (Public Act 2006 No. 69), s. 8.
30. Evidence Act (Commonwealth Act No. 2 of 1995), ss. 135 and 137.
31. Federal Rules of Evidence (1975), r. 403.
32. The phrase is found of course in certain legislation such as the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (c. 44), but in provisions that have no
immediate relation to the exclusionary discretion.
33. See also Second Reading of Evidence (Amendment) Bill, Singapore Parliament Reports, 14 February 2012 (K Shanmugam):
‘The courts’ discretion to exclude hearsay or expert opinion evidence in the interest of justice, as set out in the Bill, is—and I
emphasise this—in addition to its general power to exclude prejudicial evidence at common law. Such a general power stems
from the courts’ inherent jurisdiction, and our preference is to leave that unlegislated. Let us see how the courts exercise this
power’.
34. Pinsler (2013a: 27–35).
35. ANB v ANC [2014] SGHC 172 at [46]–[47] and [50]–[51].
36. Interestingly, while the concept of abuse of process has featured strongly in civil litigation in Singapore, it has hardly featured
in criminal jurisprudence: Yihan (2008: 405–408).
37. Second Reading of Evidence (Amendment) Bill, Singapore Parliament Reports, 14 February 2012.
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exclusionary rules, there is not much point in retaining any of the exclusionary rules and, conco-
mitantly, the exclusionary discretion as well—all evidence is admissible as the judge can accord the
appropriate weight when he has assessed the evidentiary record as a whole.38 This was indirectly
alluded to several times in the Hansard as well, but, tellingly, there was no discussion of Lee Chez
Kee or either of the Law Reform Committee reports.39
But insofar as neither Justice Loh nor JC Leow went as far as advocating abolition of the hearsay and
expert opinion rules, credit should be given for attempting to add meat to the bare bones of ss. 32(3) and
47(4). However, neither judge questioned the logically prior assumption of equating ‘in the interests of jus-
tice’ with the balancing test or addressed the main criticisms of the balancing test. To illustrate, it is well
accepted that prejudicial effect ismulti-faceted andmeans different things in different contexts; for instance,
what it means in similar fact in criminal proceedings is probably not the same as what it means in hearsay in
civil proceedings.40 Consequently, this renders the balancing exercise as an all-encompassing test impossi-
ble, as the exercise presupposes directly antithetical elements on opposing ends of a single scale.41
Secondly, it is extremely odd that the new exclusionary discretion only applies to evidence admissible
under ss. 32 and 47 andwas not extended to the other relevancy provisions in the EA such as those on similar
fact and character, despite objections raised inParliament.42However, neither judge discussed this anomaly,
which gives the impression that they assume the discretion applies to all the relevancy provisions in the EA
when it apparently does not. This is important because ss. 6–11 of the EA, or the general relevancy provi-
sions, are worded widely enough to potentially render the specific relevancy provisions (ss. 12–57) redun-
dant, and indeed there have been precedents that relied solely on the general relevancy provisions to admit
hearsay and similar fact evidence instead of their corresponding specific relevancy provisions.43Cognisance
of this would have obviated the isolation of the exclusionary discretion to ss. 32 and 47.
Thirdly, to say that the exclusionary discretion is based on the inherent jurisdiction is proble-
matic.44 No doubt this was the language used in Parliament and also a leading Court of Appeal
decision,45 and that Justice Loh had cautioned against invoking the exclusionary discretion exces-
sively, but the balancing test has been ‘applied expansively in the context of all common law exclu-
sionary rules and executive improprieties, whether captured by the [EA] or otherwise’.46 If ‘in the
interests of justice’ is accepted to be wider and more flexible than the balancing test, then this
directly contradicts the notion that a court’s inherent jurisdiction can only be invoked in very
exceptional cases, not to mention that the invocation’s goal of preventing injustice can easily be
broadly construed. It is possible to consider that the invocation of inherent jurisdiction is meant
to convey the different idea of protecting the court’s moral legitimacy (as was suggested in Wan
Tai Ling), but this is not evident from the Hansard—and in Singapore, Parliament’s intent is para-
mount when interpreting statutes.47 Moreover, it should be noted that the concept of preventing
abuse of process developed in the pre-trial stage for civil proceedings, rather than during the trial
itself. By extending the concept to the exclusion of evidence during the trial itself (which is what
the cases here seem to have done), this only introduces more complications that may not necessa-
rily be easily resolved.
38. Sek Keong (1996: 456). See also Twining (1990: 54).
39. Second Reading of Evidence (Amendment) Bill, Singapore Parliament Reports, 14 February 2012.
40. Pinsler (2013b: 225–229).
41. Ibid. Moreover, even if prejudicial effect is defined narrowly as the tendency to incriminate, this only means that
probative value has a positive correlation to prejudicial effect as non-probative value is unlikely to prejudice the
defendant.
42. Second Reading of Evidence (Amendment) Bill, Singapore Parliament Reports, 14 February 2012 (Desmond Lee).
43. Siyuan (2012: 403–405).
44. For the difference between ‘inherent jurisdiction’ and ‘inherent power’, see Siyuan (2013c).
45. Muhammad bin Kadar v Public Prosecutor [2011] 3 SLR 1205 at [52].
46. Siyuan (2012: 406).
47. Interpretation Act (ch. 1, rev. ed., 2002), s. 9A(1).
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